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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 20000728-CA 
v. 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) (1999), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does the Juvenile Court Act terminate the district court's jurisdiction over 
a juvenile bound over on a serious youth offense when he pleads guilty to a lesser 
included charge that is not a serious youth offense? 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State 
v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, f 11,997 P.2d 314 (citing State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149,151 
(Utah App. 1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-602(7) 
& (10) (1996) (addendum A): 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the 
same information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district 
court for one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising 
from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or 
felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those 
charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those 
crimes have been committed and that the defendant committed them, the 
defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those 
charges. 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of 
Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously 
exercised over the juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to district court under the Serious Youth 
Offender Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), to stand trial for attempted homicide. 
R. 9-12. At trial, the State requested and received a lesser included offense instruction 
for aggravated assault. R. 73-74, 98. The lesser included offense instruction permitted 
the jury to convict defendant of second degree felony aggravated assault if it found that 
defendant intentionally caused serious bodily injury, or of third degree felony aggravated 
assault if it found that defendant used a dangerous weapon or force likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury. R. 96 (addendum B). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). 
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The jury acquitted defendant of attempted homicide, but convicted him of 
aggravated assault. R. 108-09 (addendum C). However, because the verdict form did not 
differentiate between second degree ("causes serious bodily injury") or third degree 
felony ("uses a dangerous weapon") aggravated assault, the State agreed that the 
conviction should be entered only for a third degree felony. R. 108, 118-19; R. 222:4. 
Defendant then moved to remand his case to the juvenile court on the theory that 
because he was convicted only of a third degree felony and not any of the enumerated 
offenses in the Serious Youth Offender Act, the district court lost jurisdiction over his 
case. R. 222:5-11. The district court denied the motion. R. 222:11. 
Defendant timely appealed to this Court. R. 122. After discovering that the 
videotape for the second day of trial was missing, defendant moved for summary reversal 
on the ground that he could not obtain adequate appellate review without a complete trial 
transcript. The State stipulated to the reversal. This Court ordered a temporary remand 
to the trial court "for preparation and approval of ca statement of evidence of 
proceedings.'" R. 143. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court summarily reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. R. 150. 
On remand, defendant, pursuant to plea negotiations, pled guilty to third degree 
felony aggravated assault. R. 202-10. Defendant did not renew his motion to remand his 
case to the juvenile court or otherwise suggest that the district court had been divested of 
jurisdiction. See R. 223:2-10. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court sentenced 
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defendant to zero to five years in prison, gave him credit for the time he had already 
served (approximately twenty-one months), and suspended the remainder of the sentence. 
R. 202-03; R. 223: 10. Defendant was released without probation and his case was 
closed. R. 223:8-10. Defendant subsequently filed this appeal, claiming that the district 
court erred in not remanding the case back to the juvenile court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While defendant's brief is coy about who actually stabbed the victim, see Br. Aplt. 
at 4-5, his plea affidavit is explicit: he assaulted John Vigil "with a dangerous weapon 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury to wit: a knife." R. 205. At the change of 
plea hearing, defendant affirmed his counsel's representation that "he got in a fight with 
John Vigil and during that fight, he had a knife in his possession and used the knife," 
resulting in an injury to Vigil's throat. R. 223: 5. 
The treating physician testified that the knife sliced through Vigil's trachea "to the 
esophagus and vertebral column." R. 141: 185. The nerve to Vigil's vocal cord was 
irreparably severed, with the result that the vocal cord was permanently paralyzed in such 
a way that "it's difficult for the other vocal cord to totally close, to protect the airway or 
to have normal speech." Id. at 184. But for emergency insertion of an endotracheal or 
breathing tube, defendant's attack would have resulted in Vigil's death. R. 141:179-82. 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims the adult court lost jurisdiction over his case and was required 
to remand the case to juvenile court after the jury acquitted him of attempted murder, the 
serious youth offender charge on which he had been bound over to adult court. 
Defendant forfeited his claim by pleading guilty in district court. An 
unconditional guilty plea waives all defects except those based in subject matter 
jurisdiction. Though cast in jurisdictional terms, defendant's challenge is not to the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction but to its compliance with statutory transfer 
procedures. Consequently, under controlling Utah precedent, it is waived. 
Even if defendant did not waive his claim by pleading guilty, it lacks merit. Read 
in context, the Serious Youth Offender statute provides that when a juvenile is bound 
over, the district court obtains jurisdiction over the charged offense and all related and 
lesser offenses. This reading of the statute is consistent with the majority if not universal 
rule. A contrary ruling would preclude the district court not only from accepting a guilty 
plea on a lesser included offense, but also instructing the jury on lesser included offenses. 
Consequently, acquittal of the bindover charge did not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, defendant's argument fails because he has never been acquitted of the 
lesser included offense of second degree aggravated assault, which is also an enumerated 
serious youth offense. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE JUVENILE COURT ACT DOES NOT TERMINATE THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER A JUVENILE 
BOUND OVER ON A SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENSE WHEN HE 
PLEADS GUILTY TO A LESSER INCLUDED CHARGE THAT IS 
NOT A SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENSE 
Defendant claims that "the adult court lost jurisdiction over this case and was 
required to remand the case to juvenile court for sentencing after the jury acquitted [him] 
of the serious youth offender charge which had been the basis for the bindover to adult 
court." Br. Aplt. at 9 (capitalization omitted). Defendant forfeited this claim by pleading 
guilty in district court. It also lacks merit. 
A. Because defendant's challenge is not to the district court's 
subject matter jurisdiction but to its compliance with statutory 
transfer proceedings, he waived it by pleading guilty. 
In its Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition dated 7 September 2000, this 
Court ordered the parties to explain "whether or not, by pleading guilty, Tunzi waived his 
right to appeal any alleged pre-plea defects." Defendant took the position that his plea 
did not constitute such a waiver because the issue on appeal was jurisdictional; without 
conceding the issue, the State took the position that it was "sufficiently complex and 
novel" that the appeal ought to go to full briefing. In an order dated 11 October 2000, 
thisCourt denied the motion and deferred consideration of the issues raised "until plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case." 
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Defendant waived his claim by pleading guilty in district court. "The general rule 
applicable in criminal proceedings . . . is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed 
to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1989). "Thus, 
a knowing and voluntary guilty plea precludes reservation of issues for appeal, even those 
concerning alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 
421 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant does not claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary; rather, he 
characterizes his claim on appeal as a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
district court. See Br. Aplt. at 7. Defendant's claim fails because it is not in fact a 
challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the "authority to adjudicate the type of controversy 
involved in the action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11, p. 108 (1982). 
The district court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in this 
action. Indisputably, had defendant been certified from juvenile court pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603 (Supp. 2000) on a charge of second or even third degree felony 
aggravated assault, the district court would have acquired subject matter jurisdiction over 
defendant.1 Thus, defendant's objection is not to the district court's jurisdiction per se, 
1
 Indeed, if defendant succeeds in returning to juvenile court, he will likely be 
certified back to district court to stand trial on the charge of second degree felony 
aggravated assault. 
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but to the means by which it obtained—or retained—that jurisdiction. Such a claim is not 
"jurisdictional" and may be waived by a guilty plea. 
In re E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1991), makes this clear. In E.G.T. this 
Court held that "entry of an unconditional guilty plea [in district court] constituted a 
waiver of the claimed defects in the juvenile court certification proceedings." Id. at 140. 
E.G.T. claimed he was denied his right to counsel, a defect he claimed was jurisdictional. 
Id. Like defendant here, "E.G.T.'s contention that his appeal involve[d] jurisdictional 
issues [was] an apparent attempt to remove his guilty pleas from the general rule, since 
a jurisdictional defect cannot be waived." Id. at 139. This Court rejected his claim, 
holding that "entry of an unconditional guilty plea constituted a waiver of the claimed 
defects in the juvenile court certification proceedings." Id. at 140. 
Just as an alleged defect in transferring a juvenile from juvenile court to district 
court may be waived by guilty plea, so an alleged defect in not transferring a juvenile 
back to juvenile court from district court may be waived by guilty plea. In both situations 
a juvenile pleads guilty without objecting to a procedural misstep which he later claims 
deprived the district court of jurisdiction. Neither involves the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the district court. 
Consequently, by entering an unconditional guilty plea in district court, defendant 
waived the claim he now asserts on appeal. 
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B. The juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction over defendant 
after he was acquitted of attempted murder. 
Even if defendant's claim is properly before this Court, it lacks merit. 
1. The juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction over 
defendant because he was bound over on, and never 
acquitted of, "other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode." 
Defendant claims that "the adult court lost jurisdiction over this case and was 
required to remand the case to juvenile court for sentencing after the jury acquitted [him] 
of the serious youth offender charge which had been the basis for the bindover to adult 
court." Br. Aplt. at 9 (capitalization omitted). Defendant claims this result is mandated 
by the "plain language" of section 78-3a-602(10). Br. Aplt. at 10-11. That subsection 
states: "The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile 
when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the 
district court." 
Defendant contends that the requirements of this section were satisfied when he 
was "acquitted of attempted homicide." See Br. Aplt. at 11. This is so, he reasons, 
because "the charges" referred to in subsection (10) "are the Serious Youth Offender 
charges on which the juvenile was bound over." Id. at 12. 
Defendant claims inferential support for his limited reading of "the charges" by 
contrasting section 78-3a-602 to the certification statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603 
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(Supp. 2000). Subsection (13) of that section states, "A minor may be convicted under 
this section on the charges filed or on any other offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode." Defendant states, "No such language is included in the Serious Youth Offender 
Act." Br.Aplt.atl5. 
On the contrary, subsection 78-3a-602(7) of the Serious Youth Offender statute 
contains similar language. It provides that a juvenile bound over on a serious youth 
offense shall be bound over also on "other offenses arising from the same criminal 
episode": 
When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the 
same information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district 
court for one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising 
from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or 
felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those 
charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those 
crimes have been committed and that the defendant committed them, the 
defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those 
charges. 
Of course, "the required finding of probable cause that the defendant committed the 
crimes actually charged... necessarily would include probable cause that the defendant 
also committed the lesser included offenses..." Commonwealth v. Williams, 691 N.E.2d 
553, 556 (Mass. 1998). Thus, once a serious youth offender is bound over, the district 
court obtains jurisdiction over the serious youth charge, other related offenses, and even 
"any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies," including lesser included offenses. These 
are "the charges." 
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Thus, read in context, subsection (10)'s reference to "the charges in the district 
court" is not limited to the serious youth offense, but embraces the full array of charges 
over which the district court obtained jurisdiction at bindover. 
A different result might possibly follow if instead of "the charges" this subsection 
spoke of "the qualifying charge," as in the direct file statute, § 78-3a-601(3)(b) (Supp. 
2000): "If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of 
not guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under 
Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the minor." But even in the direct file context, "The 
district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor is allowed 
to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense." § 78-3 a-601(2) (Supp. 
2000). 
In sum, once having obtained jurisdiction over a serious youth offender, the 
district court retains jurisdiction even if the juvenile is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, 
lesser charges that would not originally have supported jurisdiction. 
This is today the majority if not universal rule. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 827 
S.W.2d 637, 640-41(Ark. 1992) (adult court did not lose jurisdiction when juvenile 
charged with murder, an enumerated offense, was convicted of manslaughter, a non-
enumerated offense on which juvenile could not have been transferred to adult court); 
People v. Davenport, 602 P.2d 871, 872 (Colo. App. 1979) ("Once an indictment 
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charging a class 1 felony is filed, the jurisdiction of the district court is expressly fixed 
. . . and that jurisdiction is not lost simply because the juvenile defendant is convicted of 
a lesser included offense"); State v. Morales, 694 A.2d 758, 763 (Conn. 1997) ("When 
a juvenile, after receiving all legislative safeguards, is transferred to the regular criminal 
docket and prosecuted for murder, the statute places him in the same position as an adult 
. . . [including] the possibility of conviction of appropriate lesser included offenses"); 
State v. Walgamotte, 415 So.2d 205,207 n.4 (La. 1982) (recognizing that the legislature 
amended the juvenile code "to provide for the district court's retaining jurisdiction over 
a juvenile defendant who, when charged with a greater crime which confers district court 
jurisdiction, pleads guilty to a lesser included offense"); Gray v. State, 253 A.2d 395,399 
(Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1969) (adult court did not lose jurisdiction over juvenile by the jury's 
return of a verdict of manslaughter, a lesser included offense); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 691 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting juvenile's claim that adult court 
could impose no sentence on lesser included offense without first remanding the case to 
juvenile court for transfer hearing or juvenile commitment); People v. Parrish, 549 
N.W.2d 32,34 (Mich. App. 1996) ("once the circuit court acquires jurisdiction to try the 
juvenile as an adult under the automatic waiver statute, it does not lose jurisdiction to 
sentence the defendant if he pleads guilty of a nonenumerated offense"); Williams v. 
State, 459 So.2d 777, 779 (Miss. 1984) ("once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by 
accepting a plea to a lesser-included offense or conviction for a lesser-included offense, 
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even though such offenses would not originally confer jurisdiction in the circuit court"); 
Dicus v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 625 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Nev. 1981) ("when the adult 
court acquires jurisdiction in a prosecution of an offense excluded from juvenile court 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is maintained to convict of the charged crime and its lesser 
included offenses"); Mason v. State, 868 P.2d 724, 727 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1994) 
("Once jurisdiction over the juvenile is properly acquired, the district court may convict 
and sentence him or her for any lesser included offense"); cf. People v. Murch, 189 N.E. 
200, 222 (N.Y. 1934) (adult court with jurisdiction to try juvenile for murder, but not 
manslaughter, properly refused manslaughter instruction). 
The contrary view would, among other deleterious effects, preclude trial courts 
from instructing on lesser included offenses, thereby "[fjorcing the jury to choose 
between murder and acquittal in a case where there is evidence of a less culpable state of 
mind." Morales, 694 A.2d at 762. Thus, a 1934 New York court with jurisdiction to try 
a juvenile for murder, but not manslaughter, was held to have properly refused a 
manslaughter instruction, since a "verdict of manslaughter or of juvenile delinquency 
would have been a nullity . . ." Murch, 189 N.E. at 222. This result would raise 
constitutional concerns today, since "due process requires that a lesser included offense 
instruction must be given" in a case where the evidence "would permit a jury to find a 
defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater . . . " State v. 
Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)). 
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This Court need not and should not adopt the novel view that a district court, 
having once exerted jurisdiction over a serious youth offender, lacks jurisdiction to 
instruct on, or receive a guilty plea for, a lesser included offense not listed as one of the 
nine serious youth offenses. The district court properly received defendant's guilty plea. 
2. The juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction, since 
defendant was not "acquitted" of second degree felony 
aggravated assault, an enumerated offense. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court were to hold that a district court loses 
jurisdiction over a serious youth offender who is acquitted of all charges that would have 
supported the original bindover to district court, defendant still loses this appeal because 
he was never acquitted of second degree felony aggravated assault, a lesser included 
offense and an enumerated serious youth offense capable of supporting bindover. 
When the jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault, it expressly acquitted 
him of attempted murder. See R. 109 (addendum C). Even if it hadn't, conviction of a 
lesser included offense is generally—though not invariably—considered an implied 
acquittal of the greater, charged offense for double jeopardy purposes. See Price v. 
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323,329 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,190-91 (1957); 
but see United States v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187, 1193 (8th Cir. 1997); People v. 
Fields, 914 P.2d 832, 834 (Cal. 1996); United States v. Allen, 755 A.2d 402,410 (D.C. 
App. 2000); Mauk v. State, 605 A.2d 157,172 (Md. App. 1992). This conclusion follows 
where the jury '"was, given a full opportunity to return a verdict' on that charge and 
14 
instead reached a verdict on the lesser charge." Price, 398 U.S. at 329 (citing Green, 355 
U.S. at 191). 
Since an "implied acquittal" of the greater charge depends upon the trial court 
having given the jury a full opportunity to return a verdict on that charge, it would seem 
that "an unambiguous conviction of a lesser-included offense is a necessary predicate for 
application of the Green-Price rule," and at least one court has so ruled. Potts v. 
State, 369 S.E.2d 746, 747 (Ga. 1988). 
In the context of a capital murder case, Potts was charged with "kidnapping with 
bodily injury" and convicted of the lesser included offense of kidnapping. Id. at 746-47. 
Potts claimed that this conviction for kidnapping, later reversed on appeal, precluded his 
reprosecution for kidnapping with bodily injury, since conviction of the lesser offense 
implied an acquittal of the greater offense under the reasoning of Price and Green. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia refused to imply an acquittal of the greater charge. 
It observed that although the jury was apprised of the greater charge, the trial court 
instructed only on the lesser included offense of kidnapping, not the greater offense of 
kidnapping with bodily injury. Similarly, the verdict form referred to simple kidnapping 
but not to kidnapping with bodily injury. Id. at 747-48. 
Under the circumstances, the court reasoned, the verdict was "opaque," and did 
not "support an inference that the jury intended to find Potts guilty of either kidnapping 
or kidnapping with bodily injury." Id. This was so because the jury "did not have the 
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option of choosing between kidnapping with bodily injury and kidnapping. The court 
compelled the jury to use an ambiguous verdict form . . ." Id. 
The case at bar also presents an ambiguous verdict. Defendant was charged with 
attempted criminal homicide. R. 26. The jury was also instructed as follows: "If after 
careful consideration, you are unable to find that the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi 
committed the crime of Attempted Homicide, as charged in the information, you are 
instructed to consider whether the defendant committed the lesser included crime of 
Aggravated Assault . . ." R. 96 (addendum B). The instruction lists as alternative 
elements that defendant "intentionally caused serious bodily injury to John R. Vigil" and 
that he "used a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury." Id. 
However, the first alternative is an element of aggravated assault, a second degree 
felony and an enumerated serious youth offense; the second alternative is an element of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony and not an enumerated offense. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-103 (1999); § 76-3a-602(l)(a)(ii) (1996). Like the instruction, the verdict 
form conflated the two forms of aggravated assault. See R. 108 (addendum C). Thus, 
although the jury found defendant guilty of "aggravated assault," it is impossible to tell 
whether they found him guilty of the enumerated offense of second degree aggravated 
assault or the non-enumerated offense of third degree aggravated assault. 
16 
As defendant stated in his motion for new trial, 'The jury did not indicate and it 
is not clear from the verdict from which degree the jury agreed upon." R. 120. "It is 
unclear from the facts and the verdict form on what basis the jury found the defendant 
guilty." R. 121. The verdict is thus "ambiguous." Id. 
As noted above, an unambiguous conviction of a lesser-included offense is a 
necessary predicate for implying acquittal of the greater offense. Where defendant cannot 
establish that the jury convicted him of the lesser offense, this Court cannot imply an 
acquittal of the greater. This is especially true here, where section 76-5-103(l)(a)'s 
requirement for second degree aggravated assault—"serious bodily injury"—was amply 
shown by medical testimony at trial. Defendant sliced through his victim's trachea "to 
the esophagus and vertebral column," leaving a vocal cord permanently paralyzed and the 
victim dying. R. at 184-85. This testimony left no reasonable doubt that defendant 
inflicted "serious bodily injury" on Vigil.2 Thus, this Court cannot from the jury's 
ambiguous verdict imply an acquittal of second degree aggravated assault. 
However, on remand defendant pled guilty. He pled to the lesser included offense 
of third degree aggravated assault, a non-enumerated offense. Did this guilty plea and 
2
 "'Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-
601(10) (1999). 
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the consequent reduction of charge constitute an implied acquittal of the serious youth 
offenses of attempted murder and second degree aggravated assault? It did not. 
The settled rule is that "there is no implied acquittal where the former conviction 
rests on a guilty plea accepted pursuant to a plea bargain .. ." Commonwealth v. Ward, 
425 A.2d 401, 407 (Pa. 1981) (holding that defendant who successfully challenged his 
guilty plea to lesser included offense of second degree murder could on remand be 
prosecuted for first degree murder); see also State v. Maguire, 1999 UT 45, f 11,975 P.2d 
476 (defendant who attacks guilty plea on appeal has no expectation in finality in original 
proceedings, and thus jeopardy does attach). Obviously, "dismissal of other charges 
following a guilty plea to one charge 'in no way indicate[s] that the defendant was 
innocent.'" Lewis v. Warner, 802 P.2d 1053, (Ariz. App. 1991) (quoting United States 
v. Myles, 430 F.Supp. 98,101 (D.D.C. 1977)). See also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 
501-02(1984). 
Since defendant's guilty plea to third degree aggravated assault was not an implied 
acquittal of second degree aggravated assault, there was not "an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or dismissal" of all serious youth charges in the district court. Consequently, 
under any understanding of the term "the charges," under section 78-3a-602(10), the 
juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction over defendant. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction on the ground that he waived his 
non-jurisdictional challenge by pleading guilty in district court. Alternatively, it should 
affirm defendant's conviction on the ground that the juvenile court never regained 
jurisdiction over defendant under the Serious Youth Offender Act. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
78-3a-601 JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 6 
TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION 
78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court. 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all 
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if commit-
ted by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the 
minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in 
Section 62A-7-101. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor 
under this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor 
regarding all offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any other 
offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal episode. The 
district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor 
is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense 
over which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsections (1) or (2) 
shall be tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or 
justice court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, 
a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the 
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Correc-
tions regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-601, enacted by L. former introductory language of the provision 
1996, ch. 1, § 69; 1996, ch. 78, § 1. as Subsection (1), redesignating former Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- tions (1) and (2) as UXa) and (1Kb), and added 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, designated the Subsections (2) and (3). 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(lXa), aggravated assault, involving inten-
tionally causing serious bodily injury to another, 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery, 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder, or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (lXa) involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsec-
tion (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and 
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1Kb), the state shall have 
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under 
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other 
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than 
the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a 
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going 
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above condi-
tions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its 
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to 
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall 
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest 
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other 
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under 
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need 
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment 
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court 
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consid-
erations listed in Subsection (3Xb). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the 
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed 
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound 
over to the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court 
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand 
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defen-
dant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of 
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
78-3a-603. Certification hearings — Juvenile court to 
hold preliminary hearing — Factors considered 
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to 
district court. 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a-
502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if 
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going 
forward with its case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the 
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain 
jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests 
of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the 
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one or 
more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by 
juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert 
with two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the 
minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in 
Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his 
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
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if) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities 
available to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 
court when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who 
will be charged with a crime in the district court; 
li) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; 
and 
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in 
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor s mental, 
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other 
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing 
the report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and 
cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, 
call witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the 
factors required by Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the 
court may enter an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the 
district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examina-
tion held by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but 
the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2Kb). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-116, Section 78-3a-913, and other 
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the 
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in 
the district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district 
court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have 
the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of 
that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section 
or when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent 
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense 
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Youth 
Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is 
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the charges filed or on 
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
Addendum B 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ X 
If after careful consideration, you are unable to find that the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi 
committed the crime of Attempted Homicide, as charged in the information, you are instructed to 
consider whether the defendant committed the lesser included crime of Aggravated Assault, if 
you find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every on^of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of November, 1998, in Salt Lake County State of 
Utah, the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi assaulted John R. Vigil and 
2. That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted John R. Vigil and 
3. That the said defendant then and there intentionally caused serious bodily injury 
to John R. Vigil; or 
4. That the said defendant used a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may 
find the defendant guilty of the lesser included crime of Aggravated Assault in lieu of Count I, 
Attempted Homicide, of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
Addendum C 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
va. 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI. 
VERDICT 
Caae No. 981926150 
Defendant 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find .... th£...de.f.endant,.. 
Joseph P.... Junzi,....Guilty of Aggravated Assault* a.lesser ..included offers 
of the Information. 
a\n Dated ...1 \..±A 19 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE QF UTAH. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 981926150 
Defendant 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find th.e..de.f.ejidant, 
.Joseph. P., ...Tunzi., No.t...Q.uJJ.U..Qf...AtteniRt.ed.Xr.iminaL.hlQiulc.i.de»...as...ch.ar.ge.d. 
in the Information. 
Dated i y.>. u TL 
.h. ct <£*Jm 
oteperson 
